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CONTINUITIES OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS:  
PROFESSOR JOHN HALEY’S WRITINGS ON 
TWELVE HUNDRED YEARS OF JAPANESE 
LEGAL HISTORY  
MARK LEVIN∗ 
History, as nearly no one seems to know, is not merely something to 
be read. And it does not refer merely, or even principally, to the 
past. On the contrary, the great force of history comes from the fact 
that we carry it within us, are unconsciously controlled by it in 
many ways, and history is literally present in all that we do. It could 
scarcely be otherwise, since it is to history that we owe our frames 
of reference, our identities, and our aspirations.1 
I. HOW WE MAKE SOUP 
In the Law and Society in Japan class that I teach each year at the 
University of Hawai‘i, I typically complete the history module of the 
course curriculum with a short talk about making soup. The story goes 
something like this: 
Imagine that you work in a fine restaurant and that you have been 
asked to make a pot of soup. You begin by filling a large kettle with water, 
putting it over the flame, and adding ingredients that will create the basic 
stock underlying a more complex creation to follow. 
Let’s look on the pot of soup that we will be making as the complex mix 
we know to be Japanese law. Thus, we took our large kettle which 
represents Japanese society and filled it with the clear spring water which 
represents the ancient indigenous Japanese legal order. As we keep that 
over the flames of time, the water takes on a Japaneseness from the pot 
and the water. 
The time is AD 660. It’s time to make the stock. In the next century, you 
put into the water a host of distinctly Chinese vegetables and spices. At the 
outset, the soup’s taste is unmistakably Chinese in character as is its 
 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, The William S. Richardson School of Law, The University of 
Hawai‘i at Mānoa, Honolulu, Hawai‘i. Thanks to the students in my Advanced Readings in Japanese 
Law class this past semester, who traveled with me in considering the issues and ideas addressed here. 
 1. James Baldwin, White Man’s Guilt, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: COLLECTED NONFICTION 
1948–1985, at 409, 410 (1985). 
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appearance when you lift the lid and look into the pot. But its character 
changes while you simmer the soup over the flames of time for eleven 
centuries. Certainly there still is an essential Chinese character in flavor 
and appearance, but the nature of the soup also reflects a Japaneseness 
that emerges from the pot of Japanese society and the flavor of the water 
that fills the pot. While one might call it a Chinese vegetable soup, it 
differs from the authentic Chinese vegetable soup being served at the 
venerable Chinese restaurant across the street. 
The late nineteenth century arrives and it is time to radically transform 
our creation. You take down a colander from the shelf and strain the soup 
into a newer, but still Japanese, pot. Consider what a rich stock you have! 
Although you’ve removed the visible structures of Chinese cuisine, 
needless to say, the centuries of simmering the Chinese vegetables and 
spices have created a broth profoundly imbued with a Chinese flavor at its 
core. And so now when you add French celery and carrots, German 
potatoes and onions, and even a tad bit of Anglo-American corn, the 
complexity of flavors that will delight your patrons begins to emerge. 
When we look at the soup, we might no longer call it a Chinese vegetable 
soup. Rather, it appears to be essentially a continental European dish 
(with a tiny bit of Anglo-Americanism). Nonetheless, any taster senses 
what is obvious. This continental European vegetable soup has both a 
strong underlying flavor of the full-bodied Chinese ingredients that were 
there for eleven hundred years and distinctly Japanese characteristics that 
emerged over time. 
Now return your soup to the modern pot of Japanese society and 
simmer on the flames of time again, topping it off with a bit more clear 
Japanese spring water. Leave it on the heat for fifty years or so, allowing 
all of these influences to mix and develop. While the pot and water once 
again add Japaneseness to the flavor, the newly added “Western” 
vegetables are imparting new flavors on top of the “Eastern” stock. 
Certainly, when we arrive at 1925 and your assistant looks to see what 
you have, it now looks to be continental European vegetable soup. Of 
course, as chef, you know better. The older underlying East Asian tastes 
are still plainly in the background. 
It’s the late 1940s. Your guests will be arriving soon, so it’s time to add 
the finishing touches. First, remove some, though not all, of the French 
and German vegetables, and add more Anglo-American ingredients—
corn, wild mushrooms, and a full handful of midwestern constitutional 
bacon—surely that will add a whole new element to the creation! Turn up 
the flame to reflect modernity’s faster pace and bring everything in the 
mix up to a full boil. Through the next sixty years, generously sprinkle 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/10
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herbs into the pot—mostly American parsley but a bit of French thyme, 
German rosemary, and even new varieties of herbs coming out of the 
world culture of international law. Keep topping off the soup with pure 
Japanese water and watch as a Japaneseness is again infused through and 
through. 
At last you are done. We’ve come to the present and we can enjoy our 
soup. 
So what have we got?  
Alas, the restaurant’s owner insists on calling it “a kind of European 
vegetable soup.” Granted, to look into the soup one sees mostly the 
French and German vegetables, though the later-added American 
vegetables and constitutional bacon are certainly immediately evident. But 
again you know better. This soup is unique, existing nowhere else. Aged 
undertones and modern sparkle combine in a remarkable collection of 
ingredients and flavors, some bitter and some sweet, to provide a special 
complexity worthy of acclaim by the greatest chefs in the world.  
Now taste. Slowly. Carefully. After all, you’ve worked very hard and 
earned this chance. Though not immediately apparent to the eye, one 
senses the powerful Chinese stock developed in eleven hundred years over 
the flames of time as well as both the ancient and modern Japaneseness 
that the spring water and our cooking pots have transmitted. These flavors 
mingle with the modern European and Anglo-American vegetables which 
predominate the creation, though the just added herbs continue to enliven 
and change our soup even up until the moment we ladle it into bowls, 
which is now. 
I hope this story of soup has meaning to you. As James Baldwin told 
us, “history is literally present in all that we do.”2 Understanding how the 
soup was created should provide you a foundation for understanding its 
appearance and the ability to knowingly search your taste buds for 
component flavors. That subtle tasting is the true delight of legal history 
for the epicurean Japanese law scholar. 
II. ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF HISTORY ALIVE IN THE PRESENT 
Although the soup metaphor is mine, my pleasure in teaching Japanese 
law and my understanding of Japanese legal history come from the lessons 
I’ve learned from Professor John Owen Haley. I had the good fortune to 
study Japanese legal history in Professor Haley’s Japanese Law course at 
 
 
 2. Id. 
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the University of Washington in the fall semester of 1989. It was precisely 
then that Professor Haley was finishing the manuscript of Authority 
Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox.3 And so, after working 
through the source materials Professor Haley presented in the course text 
and attending the corresponding lectures, the first four chapters of 
Authority Without Power were quite familiar to me as a reader. Moreover, 
they have been a fundamental resource for my subsequent work as a 
lawyer and law professor.  
While other works have presented elements of Japanese legal history,4 
to the best of my knowledge, no other English-language writing has 
presented the topic in a single coherent presentation from the ancient to the 
present.5 Only Haley gives us all the soup’s ingredients—Japanese, 
Chinese, French, German, and Anglo-American.6 However, the careful 
historical record is not what ranks these four chapters as a tour de force in 
Professor Haley’s oeuvre. This writing is significant because it explicitly 
connects the past with the present. It is what allows us today to taste 
flavors in the soup from faraway distant times, the middle ages, and the 
recent past. And drawing upon that understanding further helps us in 
trying to predict the future. 
This result is hardly accidental. In fact, Professor Haley shares 
Baldwin’s approach when he states his aims in the first paragraph 
preceding Chapter 1: “One cannot understand the present without an 
appreciation of the past and the role of present perceptions of that past. To 
appreciate the historical dynamics of Japan’s legal tradition is vital both to 
 
 
 3. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 
(1991). 
 4. See, e.g., the twelve English-language books and longer monographs cited by Harald Baum 
and Luke Nottage in the legal history section of their extensive bibliography of Japanese law. HARALD 
BAUM & LUKE NOTTAGE, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW IN WESTERN LANGUAGES: AN ANNOTATED 
SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY (1998). Regrettably, Baum and Nottage overlook Haley’s Authority 
Without Power in that portion of their work.  
 5. Carl Steentrup’s comprehensive historical work comes closest to the challenge, but as 
indicated by his title, the clock stops at 1868. CARL STEENSTRUP, A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 
1868 (1991). 
 6. International law influences are missing from the work, presumably because these flavors 
were added primarily in postwar history, which is less developed in Authority Without Power’s 
recitation. See, e.g., Hisashi Owada, Japan, International Law and the International Community, in 
JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 347 (Nisuke Ando ed., 1999); YUJI 
IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW: THE IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW (1998); Kenneth L. Port, The Japanese International Law 
“Revolution”: International Human Rights Law and Its Impact in Japan, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 139 
(1991). 
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comprehend more fully the present as well as to predict more accurately 
the future.”7 
But of course things can never be simple or we academics might go out 
of business. Professor Haley, who explicitly connects the word “paradox” 
to Japanese law in the title of his book, presents continuities from 
historical times amidst the dynamics of dramatic change as a puzzle for us 
to explore: 
[S]ince change inexorably also confirms and reinforces something 
of the past, like all other social orders Japan’s too reflects elements 
of continuity with change. For those who wish to understand both, 
the puzzle is to identify and fit together pieces of the process and 
the links between past and present. This then is the aim of the 
chapters that follow.8 
This then is also the aim of this brief Essay. Working from Professor 
Haley’s division of the historical process into four major temporal 
components—Nara, Kamakura, Tokugawa, and Meiji, I hope to suggest 
how pieces of the historical puzzle are evident in Japanese legal dynamics 
at work since the publication of Authority Without Power nearly twenty 
years ago. Then, I will conclude by trying to assess what we may be able 
to imagine coming soon in Japan’s future.  
A. Legacies of the Sinicized Administrative State 
Haley’s historical account begins at the end of the fifth century when 
“the uji controlling the fertile Yamato Plain in Southwestern Honshū . . . 
emerged as the dominant political force.”9 But the real story begins shortly 
thereafter when “the emergent political leaders of Japan would . . . find in 
imperial Chinese institutions and concepts welcome models for their own 
statecraft.”10 This “selective adaptation of Chinese legal institutions . . . 
remained in theory Japan’s fundamental national law for over a 
millennium.”11  
Haley describes this foundational legal system as paradigmatic of an 
administrative state. It was, at the core, a public law order—“an instrument 
of government control quite separate from any moral or religious order 
 
 
 7. HALEY, supra note 3, at 17.  
 8. Id. at 18.  
 9. Id. at 29. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
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serving the interests of those who exercised paramount political 
authority.”12 Accordingly, the system lacked any conceptual footing in 
what the Western tradition terms “rights.”13 Similarly, the Western notion 
of “justice” through which “[l]aw was and continues to be fused with 
morality” was absent.14  
Here begins the dynamic that gives Haley’s book its name. This 
sinicized legal order reserved an unbounded degree of legal authority for 
the state. “There was no developed concept separating ‘public’ and 
‘private’ spheres of activity to contain state authority. Instead, private 
activity was in effect those areas that the state chose to exclude from its 
regulatory reach rather than a realm to which its authority could not 
extend.”15  
How then might power have been lacking to create the so-called 
paradox of Authority Without Power? The answer is rather simple: “Much 
was in fact beyond coercive state control simply because of limitations in 
resources or political and social limits to official intrusion.”16 In short, 
Haley characterizes Japan’s administrative state as having boundless 
authority and yet profoundly constrained power. 
The primacy of public law had practical implications in dispute 
resolution between private individuals as well as administrative 
governance. For example, given that the primary concern of the 
adjudicatory process was the interests of the state,17 there evolved an 
“emphasis on amicable settlement of private disputes—or more accurately, 
coerced compromise—[that] tended to preserve if not increase social 
inequalities, dependency relations, and the influence of those with social 
and economic power.”18  
Later in the book, Haley shows how this eleven hundred-year-old 
history came alive in the recent past, first when the Japanized Chinese 
legal tradition blended with Western law in the Meiji period and then 
 
 
 12. Id. at 19. 
 13. Id. at 21. 
 14. Id. at 24. 
 15. Id. at 27. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Critical legal scholars would surely reply that Western legal systems share these 
circumstances. The difference is merely between the primacy of state interests being overtly displayed 
in the sinicized legal order and the same being strategically masked in our Western legal tradition. See, 
e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The 
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1984) (“Law [for critical 
legal scholars] is simply politics dressed in different garb; it neither operates in a historical vacuum nor 
does it exist independently of ideological struggles in society.”).  
 18. HALEY, supra note 3, at 23. See also DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND 
JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MODERN (1965). 
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again in the postwar modern period.19 Through these later chapters, Haley 
reveals how efforts to incorporate Western notions of “rights” into the 
legal system and nascent claims to expect “justice” from that system 
defined the fault lines for an entire century in Japan.20 
Tensions from these historical traditions remain evident today as Japan 
has progressed through the administrative and judicial reform processes of 
the past fifteen years. The struggles have played out in the dynamics of old 
versus new in new administrative reform laws, a massive national 
government restructuring, and the judicial system reform processes.  
For example, decades of legislative efforts were required to get 
Japanese bureaucrats to relinquish formal authority and be constrained by 
statutes.21 Change arrived with the 1991 Administrative Procedure Law.22 
But despite the fact that a number of laws similarly redefining the role of 
Japan’s administrators has emerged more recently,23 criticism remains that 
these laws have been inadequate to restructure the fundamental 
relationship between citizens and the administrative state in Japan.24 
Another aspect of the boundless authority of Japanese bureaucracies in 
the modern age that Authority Without Power documents are ministry 
 
 
 19. For a description of the emergence of rights notions in Meiji Japan, see HALEY, supra note 3, 
ch. 4 (especially 72–77). Regarding postwar administrative law, see id., ch. 7 (especially 153–68). See 
also John O. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law: An Introduction, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN 
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 37 (John O. Haley ed., 1988). 
 20. See HALEY, supra note 3. 
 21. Haley, supra note 19, at 42. See also Lorenz Ködderitzsch, Japan’s New Administrative 
Procedure Law: Reasons for Its Enactment and Likely Implications, 24 LAW IN JAPAN 105, 111–14 
(1991). Lorenz Ködderitzsch reports that “any movement toward the codification of administrative 
procedure rules had to reckon with the inertia if not the opposition of most ministries.” Id. at 114. 
 22. Gyōsei tetsuzukihō [Administrative Procedure Law], Law No. 88 of 1993, translated in 3 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 182 (2002). The 2005 revision is available in Japanese at http://www.cas. 
go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APA.pdf. 
 23. See, e.g., Gyōseikikan no hoyū suru jyōhō no kōkai ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning the 
Disclosure of Information Held by Administrative Organs (Freedom of Information Law)], Law No. 
42 of 1999, translated in 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2002) (2004 revision), available at 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/AAIHAO.pdf; Gyōseikikan ga okonau seisaku no hyōka 
ni kansuru hōritsu [Government Policy Evaluations Act], Act No. 86 of 2001, available at 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/GPEA.pdf (English translation); Gyōseikikan no hoyū 
suru kojin jyōhō no hogo ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by 
Administrative Organs], Act No. 58 of 2003, available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/ 
APPIHAO.pdf (English translation). 
 24. See, e.g., John O. Haley, Heisei Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal Reforms 
Really Changing Japan?, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR JAPANISCHES RECHT [J. JAPANESE LAW] 7 (2005); 
Ichirō Ozaki, Judicial System Reform and Legalization, in EMERGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS IN 
JAPANESE LAW 211, 216–17 (Harry N. Scheiber & Laurent Miyali eds., 2007); LAWRENCE REPETA & 
DAVID M. SCHULTZ, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION: NEW RULES FOR ACCESS (2002), 
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/japanfoia.html. 
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establishment laws representing a “mission to manage.”25 These 
subsequently came into focus in the Japanese government’s massive 
restructuring efforts of 2001. When enabling legislation was enacted for 
this reform in 1998,26 the Yomiuri newspaper identified the authority 
allowed by unbounded laws as the foremost problem with the status quo. 
The Yomiuri editors’ hope for more restrictive establishment laws for the 
newly promulgated governmental organizations evidences the same 
grappling with the old sinicized public law order. 
As the Yomiuri editors wrote: 
The current establishment laws offer comprehensive, but somewhat 
vague, definitions of power. . . . Neither the United States nor any 
industrialized European nation gives such comprehensive discretion 
to authorities and government bodies. Therefore, it can be said that 
the old ministry establishment laws were at the root of Japanese 
style “bureaucratic” rule. . . . It is almost certain, however, that the 
bureaucrats will strongly resist any moves to weaken their authority. 
Healthy relations between politicians and bureaucrats in the 21st 
century will depend on how the politicians can deal with such 
resistance.27 
Finally, the 2001 recommendations of the Justice System Reform 
Council authoritatively delivered a transformative vision of the role of law 
and society moving into the twenty-first century.28 But this work has not 
been easily implemented due to administrators’ foot-dragging as well as a 
conservative political backlash holding back progress for many of the 
proposed reforms.29 Again, we can see the tight grip of vestigial historical 
consciousness. And the primary fault line lies precisely where Authority 
Without Power guides us to look: between the unbounded authority of the 
administrative state, established in the seventh century, and a more 
 
 
 25. HALEY, supra note 3, at 154. See also John O. Haley, Mission to Manage: The U.S. Forest 
Service as a “Japanese” Bureaucracy, in THE U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP: CAN IT BE 
IMPROVED? 196 (Kichirō Hayashi ed., 1989).  
 26. Kokka gyōsei soshiki hō [National Government Organization Act], Act No. 120 of 1948, 
available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/ngo.pdf. 
 27. Editorial, Establishment Laws Depend on Politicians, DAILY YOMIURI, June 10, 1998, at 6. 
 28. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATION OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 
COUNCIL FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html (English translation). 
 29. Professor Setsuo Miyazawa is the first to present this story with extensive documentation and 
detail in an English-language publication. See Setsuo Miyazawa, Law Reform, Lawyers, and the 
Judiciary, in JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW 39 (Gerald Paul McAlinn ed., 2007). 
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constrained approach finally offering power to the people in the twenty-
first century.30  
We can see this in the Council’s carefully chosen words:  
This is a transformation in which the people will break out of 
viewing the government as the ruler (the authority) and instead will 
take heavy responsibility for governance themselves, and in which 
the government will convert itself into one that responds to such 
people.31 
B. Feudal Village and Castle Town: The Quiet Dance of Law and Non-
law 
Chapters Two and Three of Authority Without Power bring the reader 
through the centuries between Japan’s selective borrowings from T’ang 
China in the seventh and eighth centuries to the Meiji Restoration in 1868, 
after which open reliance upon Chinese models of the role of law in 
society would soon be set aside. Developments in Japanese law during 
these centuries were, perhaps not surprisingly, more Japanese in character, 
reflecting the particularities of state and society through those years.  
Again the book introduces us to dynamics which remain alive and 
thereby help our understanding of Japan today. The most powerful societal 
force in Haley’s account is the social cohesion of the village, emerging 
with fictive kinship relations as the basis of the feudal contract,32 leading 
to a “control system through dependency” after Hideyoshi’s hei-nō-bunri 
edict removed the samurai from rural communities,33 and finally 
culminating in the carefully structured relationships maintained and 
managed throughout the Tokugawa period.34 
 
 
 30. Cf. JOHN LENNON AND THE PLASTIC ONO BAND, POWER TO THE PEOPLE (Apple Records 
1971) (video available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wos-dDxpJlQ). 
 31. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 28, at ch. I, pt. 1, § 1. Moreover, among the 
chief goals of the Justice System Reform Council’s reform is to restructure dispute resolution between 
private parties. Here too, the sinicized emphasis on amicable settlement of private disputes—or more 
accurately, coerced compromise—should give way to a program in which “all people are treated 
equally and an impartial third party makes a decision based on fair and clear legal rules and principles 
through fair procedures.” Id. ch. I, pt. 2. 
 32. HALEY, supra note 3, at 37–38. 
 33. Id. at 46. 
 34. Id. at 58–65. 
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1. From the Minamotos to the Warring States 
At the outset, Haley frames “the institutional history of Japan from the 
late twelfth through the mid-sixteenth centuries [as] the repetition of 
earlier patterns—the conflicts and tensions between the holders of power 
at the center and those at the periphery, who in control of greater resources 
challenged the center and asserted their own independence.”35 This tug-of-
war is, needless to say, still very much alive in Japan and has played out 
through the public debates and struggles with regard to the principle of 
local autonomy provided for in Article 92 of the Constitution of Japan.36 
Presently, the center is clearly the dominant force, as it has been since the 
successful Meiji nation-building of the late nineteenth century. Perhaps 
there is no better example of this than Governor Masahide Ota’s 
unsuccessful challenge to national authority with respect to the 
compulsory leasing of lands for U.S. military bases in Okinawa.37 
Moreover, as noted above, Haley explains that from the early years of 
the Kamakura Period, Japan’s landowning elites drew upon fictive notions 
of kinship to establish the feudal relationship between vassal and serf.38 
This is in contrast to the fictive contract that had been the basis of such 
relationships in Europe.39 
Haley explicitly ties this notion of kinship to modern Japan: 
[E]ach characterization had a certain logic of its own with 
consequences for each society. . . . [In Japan, c]ontinued reliance on 
real and fictive kinship, combined with neo-Confucianist emphasis 
on the reciprocal duties of benevolence and loyalty, was . . . to form 
the basis for the familial characterization of the modern Japanese 
state.40  
 
 
 35. Id. at 2, 35. 
 36. “Regulations concerning organizations and operations of local public entities shall be fixed 
by law in accordance with the principle of local autonomy.” KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 92. See 
Yoshiaki Yoshida, Authority of the National and Local Governments Under the Constitution, in 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
 37. Ōta v. Hashimoto, 50 MINSHŪ 1952 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 28, 1996), available at http://www. 
courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1996.08.28-1996-Gyo-Tsu-No.90.html (English translation). See 
Masahide Ōta, At the Supreme Court of Japan As the Governor of Okinawa, in ESSAYS ON OKINAWA 
PROBLEMS 233 (2000). See generally MIYUME TANJI, MYTH, PROTEST AND STRUGGLE IN OKINAWA 
(2006); MASAMICHI S. INOUE, OKINAWA AND THE U.S. MILITARY: IDENTITY MAKING IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (2007). 
 38. HALEY, supra note 3, at 37. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 37–38. 
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Professor Ichiro Ozaki and I have hypothesized that these feudal 
notions, brought forward to the modern state in the manner Haley portrays, 
remain profoundly significant today for Japan’s many minority 
communities.41 The prevailing myth of Japanese homogeneity framed out 
of fictive Meiji kinship of all Japanese subjects with the Emperor was 
powerfully established as a core element of Meiji nation building42 and 
represents the nucleus of the notion of Japanese identity which I term 
Wajin-ness.43 In some regards, this widely dispersed self-conceptualization 
is the original source of the destructive impacts on minorities associated 
with Wajin-ness in Japan today.44 
2. In the Castle Town and Village 
Beginning from the mid-sixteenth century, Japan was vastly 
transformed by the “three unifiers” of medieval Japan—Nobunaga Oda, 
who unified Japan through military force; Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who 
established the fundamental governance policies that followed unification; 
and Ieyasu Tokugawa, who, together with his successors, sustained and 
adapted these structures to last for 260 years. “In this combination we find 
paradigms of governance that help explain the peculiar contours and 
multifaceted paradox of law and social control in contemporary Japan.”45 
As Haley explains: 
All of these changes took place in the context of one of the pivotal 
events in Japanese history, the establishment of the castle town 
[jōkamachi]. . . . This coercive “push” out of the village and “pull” 
to the castle and the resulting resettlement of the samurai led not 
only to the expanded development of officialdom and judicial legal 
 
 
 41. Mark A. Levin & Ichiro Ozaki, Disparate Impacts of Family Law on Japan’s Racial and 
Ethnic Minorities, Paper Presented at the 2008 Sho Sato Conference on Japanese Law: Japanese 
Family Law in Comparative Perspective, University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law 
(Mar. 6–8, 2008) (on file with author). 
 42. See HALEY, supra note 3, at 37–38; TESSA MORRIS-SUZUKI, RE-INVENTING JAPAN: TIME, 
SPACE, NATION 84–85 (1998); BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 94–99 (1983). 
 43. See Mark A. Levin, The Wajin’s Whiteness: Law and Race Privilege in Japan, 80 HŌRITSU 
JIHŌ 80 (2008) (Ozaki trans.) (on file with author). 
 44. In a similar fashion, the so-called “company-man” notion of employer-employee relations as 
a fictive kinship underlies the destructive forces that Professor Tatsuo Inoue has identified in his 
powerful essay on death by overwork (karōshi) in Japan. Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind 
Communality: Looking Through the Window of Japan, 1993 BYU L. REV. 517. Inoue points to a 
maternal “ethic of care” as underlying Japan’s communitarian “kaishashugi.” Id. at 529–30. 
 45. HALEY, supra note 3, at 51. 
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controls in urban centers but also to intensified forms of extralegal 
social controls in the village.46 
While his primary focus is on the implications of the dynamics of 
village life, Haley first highlights the potency of administrative official 
controls in Tokukawa urban centers.47 This phenomenon evidences how 
the ongoing bureaucratic state, already discussed above, not only remained 
a constant, but grew ever stronger through the centuries, building to the 
paradigmatic administrative state Haley portrays as vitally active in Japan 
today.  
[A]t least within Japan’s urban centers the regulatory controls of the 
public authorities were increasingly intensified and perfected. . . . 
The economic and social lives of merchants, artisans, and common 
laborers became increasingly regimented and restricted. . . . In short, 
urban Japan experienced, in John Whitney Hall’s words, “a density 
of administrative supervision that few peoples have ever 
matched.”48 
But again, Haley principally wants the reader to look to “a critical new 
element, the semiautonomous village”49—which he presents in an 
extended section of Chapter Three as “[t]he pivotal element of the 
Tokugawa legal order.”50 
Given the significance of this writing, I quote extensively: 
 Viewed from above, the mura, like its urban counterpart the 
machi, appeared to be an intensively regulated community. . . .  
 Focus on the volume and scope of regulatory edicts alone is 
misleading, however.  
 . . . .  
 . . . To the contrary, official reliance on village self-government 
and indirect rule through the mediation of village headmen enabled 
the village to disregard unwanted restrictions. . . .  
 Autonomy had a price. For the community and the individual, 
conflict avoidance and deference to authority were the prerequisites 
of self-governance and independence. So long as peace prevailed 
and taxes were paid, there was little to draw official attention and 
 
 
 46. Id. at 46. 
 47. Id. at 55. 
 48. Id. at 56–57. 
 49. Id. at 51. 
 50. Id. at 58. 
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scrutiny. However, any open conflict or breach of peace threatened 
that autonomy and invited investigation and more stringent controls. 
By suppressing intracommunity quarrels and satisfying formal fiscal 
obligations, a village community could restrain or avoid unwanted 
official regulation. The consequence was an institutional structure 
that in allowing evasion of official legal controls also promoted 
external deference and internal cohesion. . . . 
 To achieve or maintain such autonomy with ostensible 
conformity the community itself had to develop mechanisms of 
control. The most prominent included the psychological sanction of 
collective community displeasure as well as more severe forms of 
community coercion, such as ostracism and expulsion. . . .  
 In this environment individual interests were generally 
subsumed by community and family concerns. . . .  
 . . . At each level of social organization from family through the 
village, overt and superficial conformity to legally prescribed rules 
of conduct would thus be emphasized at the expense of actual 
compliance. Truly secret behavior would not matter. . . .  
 . . . . 
 More influential than either the administrative or judicial 
instruments of government control and ordering, however, was their 
containment. Indirect governance of the mura and the machi 
prompted resort to a complex variety of consensual or contractual 
means of social control. . . . Formal legal rules were best 
acknowledged with an obsequious bow but kept at arm’s length and, 
if possible, ignored or evaded.51  
These pages give us a treasure trove of information for understanding 
multiple elements of modern Japanese society, including its political and 
business worlds. To begin with, if truly secret behavior does not matter, 
this should help explain an environment where it is better to keep a dark 
secret for the sake of the nation or organization than divulge it for the 
public benefit. For example, Japan’s tobacco industry, with approximately 
ten percent global market share, surely protects a vast body of yet 
unexposed secret stories of knowingly harmful commercial behavior that 
is responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths annually.52 And might 
 
 
 51. Id. at 59–64. 
 52. See, e.g., Mark A. Levin, Smoke Around the Rising Sun: An American Look at Tobacco 
Regulation in Japan, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 99 (1997); see generally JUDITH MACKAY & MICHAEL 
ERIKSEN, THE TOBACCO ATLAS (2d ed. 2006).  
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this emphasis on secrecy also explain why it took decades for Japan’s 
gruesome history of sexual slavery in the mid twentieth century to come to 
light?53 Haley’s pages thus connect us directly to the frequency of 
scandal54 as well as the “near-total absence”55 of the whistleblower in 
modern Japan, at least until recent years. 
Finally, the “obsequious bow” that Haley mentions also sheds light on 
another modern phenomenon—administrative guidance (gyōsei shidō).56 
Haley’s presentation may help us see how the “beauty” of administrative 
guidance varies greatly by the subjective eye of the beholder. If Japanese 
businesses have inherited the status of the Tokugawa semiautonomous 
village, then regardless of whether the bureaucrats’ dictates are lawful or 
not, a Japanese firm’s wisest strategy should be to show external deference 
while an inspector is present and then to patiently await her departure. 
This should generally suffice to enable the company to get back to 
business as it wishes.  
But then let us imagine an outside observer traveling together with the 
inspector. It seems extremely unlikely that the locals would candidly 
reveal the law’s impotence to the outsider, who would instead think he had 
witnessed bureaucratic autocracy. And yet at the same time, if a few 
unfortunate firms are selected out to genuinely suffer a bureaucratic heavy 
hand,57 their representative’s true testimony would nonetheless be 
inaccurate when extrapolated out to a global generalization.  
 
 
 53. See Mark A. Levin, Case Comment, Nishimatsu Construction Co. v. Song Jixiao et al.; Kō 
Hanako et al. v. Japan, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 148 (2008). See generally YUKI TANAKA, JAPAN’S 
COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY AND PROSTITUTION DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE US 
OCCUPATION (2002). 
 54. “[T]he number of incidents that come to light as public scandal in the United States pales in 
comparison to that in Japan, its famed quality control notwithstanding.” MARK D. WEST, SECRETS, 
SEX, AND SPECTACLE: THE RULES OF SCANDAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 135 (2006). 
Arguably, pharmaceutical and environmental scandals have provided the most notorious stories in 
Japan’s postwar years, but giant scandals concerning food products and other consumer goods have 
been notable in recent years. Mark West’s book gives us the clearest window into these circumstances 
in Japan today. See also id. at 49 (listing major whistleblowing incidents between 2000 and 2005).  
 55. Id. at 45. It is perhaps with Haley’s historical framing in mind that West aptly notes “[t]he 
roots seem deeper than the laws on the books.” Id. 
 56. Some readers may recall a time when literature on the so-called Japanese phenomenon of 
administrative guidance overflowed the pages of legal scholarship written by outside observers of 
Japan. As Mark Ramseyer wryly noted, this dynamic of businesses ostensibly being compelled to 
follow illegal bureaucratic dictates “surely comes near the top of any ranking of Japanological topics 
by their pages:ideas ratio.” J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Administrative Guidance, in FINANCE, 
GOVERNANCE, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN JAPAN 199, 199 (Masahiko Aoki & Gary R. Saxonhouse 
eds., 2000).  
 57. Such is the reported experience of some foreign firms under intense bureaucratic scrutiny. 
See, e.g., JACKSON N. HUDDLESTON, GAIJIN KAISHA: RUNNING A FOREIGN BUSINESS IN JAPAN 
(1990). 
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III. THE INERTIA OF HISTORY VERSUS THE MOMENTUM OF REFORM 
Professor Haley gets it. Though James Baldwin argues that “nearly no 
one seems to know” of history’s engagement in the present, John Haley 
shows us that he knows.  
This brief Essay, drawn upon Haley’s writings, has addressed Japan’s 
recent events of administrative law reform, judicial system reform, local 
autonomy conflicts, the marginalization of minorities, scandal, 
whistleblowers, and a realpolitik glimpse at the dynamics underlying 
administrative guidance. For all of these topics, the first chapters of 
Authority Without Power introduce us to deeply resonant flavors in the 
soup of Japanese law today. 
John Haley’s historical writings help us predict the future by presenting 
so clearly the powerful inertial forces rooted in the history of law in Japan. 
These forces are precisely the weights dragging upon the momentum of 
Heisei reforms.58 But then we have seen much change happen in Japan 
recently. Many, if not most, Japanese law scholars are presently exploring 
the possibilities for major change caused by the wave of legal reforms 
underway in Japan today. This points to the million-dollar question of 
which reforms will succeed and which will silently fade away.59 
I conclude with one contemplation that ties back to the absence of the 
Western notion that justice fuses law and morality during Japan’s eleven 
hundred years of experience with Chinese law traditions.60 
The concept of justice61 serves as Polaris, the navigational target for 
many Western discussions of law. Perhaps the endpoint is unattainable, 
but at the very least, justice provides the direction toward which lofty 
idealists in our tradition steer their ships. And so in this regard, given that 
justice is a new arrival to Japanese legal discourse, it is interesting to note 
that the concept was presented as one of the cardinal points for the Judicial 
System Reform Council’s grand mission: 
Justice is expected to correct illegal actions and to provide a remedy 
for injured persons’ rights in concrete cases and contests by 
properly resolving the cases and contests in question through proper 
 
 
 58. As noted above, Professor Haley has questioned whether these present reforms are “really 
changing Japan.” Haley, supra note 24, at 5.  
 59. See EMERGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS IN JAPANESE LAW, supra note 24, and LAW IN JAPAN: 
A TURNING POINT (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) for two extensive collections of essays addressing these 
vital issues.  
 60. HALEY, supra note 3, at 24. 
 61. If justice can not be “known,” at least we know it can be endlessly debated. For one starting 
point, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999) and its vast progeny. 
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interpretation and application of law; to play a role in coping with 
violations of rules appropriately by properly and promptly realizing 
the power of punishment through fair procedures; and thereby to 
maintain and to develop the law. Accordingly, the judicial function 
has an aspect of realization of public values, and the courts (the 
judicial branch) shall be positioned as a pillar supporting “the space 
of the public good” (kokyosei no kukan) in parallel with the Diet 
and the Cabinet (the political branches), which seek to create order 
by mapping out policies against the backdrop of majority rule and 
by fixing and conclusively executing norms in the form of law for 
the future.62 
At least in theory, justice has arrived in Japan. The challenge for all 
involved will be to help transform that theory into reality. And with John 
Haley’s teachings, we are far better prepared for the journey.  
 
 
 62. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 28, at ch. I, pt. 2, § 1. 
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